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_ 1.0 INTRODUCTION
The CARE III (C_omputer-AidedR_eliabilityEstimation,
version three) computer program is being developed as a
general-purpose reliability estimation tool for fault-tolerant
avionics systems. The first CARE Program, developed at the
Jet Propulsion Laboratory in 1971, provided an aid for esti-
mating the reliability of systems consisting of a combination
of any of several standard configurations (e.g. standby-
replacement configurations, triple-modular redundant configu-
rations, etc.) Non-unity dormancy factors were allowed as
well as user-supplied non-unity coverage probabilities.
_ CARE II was subsequently developed by Raytheon, under
contract to the NASA Langley Research Center, in 1974. It,
_ like the original CARE, was based on a combinatorial reli-
ability model. The model in this case, however, was consider-
,: ably more versatile.
A simple mathematical expression was used to evaluate
the reliability of any redundant configuration over any
interval during which the failure rates and coverage parameters
"" remained unaffected by configuration changes. In addition,
provision was made for convolving such expressions in order to
evaluate the reliability of a "dual-mode" system; i.e., a
system in which a single coverage-parameter/failure-rate con-
figuration change was allowed during the interval of interest.
A coverage model was also developed to determine the various
relevant coverage coefficients as a function of the available
hardware and software fault detector characteristics (detec-
-- tion delay, scheduling interval, etc.), and the subsequent
isolation and recovery delay statistics.
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CARE II suffers from two limitations that make it
difficult to use as a general-purpose reliability estimation
tool for avionics systems. The most serious of these limi-
tations is its two-mode restriction. In many avionics system
configurations, each new failure precipitates a mode change
(i.e., a failure rate or coverage coefficient change). Con-
sequently, many operating modes are possible. While CARE II --
could be modified to allow this possibility, the resulting
program would be cumbersome and the computer run-time excessive.
A second limitation in CARE II is the lack of a mechanism
for specifying multiple success criteria; i.e., for allowing
the user to indicate that there are several operational system
configurations, as is almost always the case in avionics sys-
tems. Although this latter limitation could be easily remedied
within the CARE II structure, the former could not. According-
ly, it was decided to develop a more general reliability esti-
mation computer program specifically designed to overcome these
limitations. The present report summarizes the accomplishments
made during the first phase of this two-phase effort.
Three tasks were emphasized during phase one: requirements
assessment; definition of program structure; development of
the reliability model. The remaining work needed to complete
the objectives of the CARE III program will be accomplished
during phase two; viz: adaptation of the CARE II coverage model
to satisfy CARE III requirements; development of a user inter-
face for system configuration and success criteria specifica-
tion; integration of the various program modules into a unified
program structure.
-- The structure postulated for the CARE III program is
described in section 4. In brief, the program will consist
-- of three independent modules. CAREIN interprets user inputs
defining the system structure, the system success criteria,
-- the various fault models and coverage parameters, and generates
files to be used by COVRGE and CARE3. COVRGE then translates
-- these specifications into the coverage parameters associated
with each of the various system stages and operating modes.
The third program module, CARE3, operates on files generated
by both CAREIN and COVRGE to produce system reliability
-- estimates in accordance with the user-defined success criteria.
The major effort during phase one was devoted to developing
and programming the reliability model to be implemented in
CARE3. The results of'this effort are described in detail in
section 3. The selected mathematical model is based on
Kolmogorov's forward equations. In a parallel effort, a
detailed examination was made into techniques for obtaining
solutions to multi-state Markov models. The initial impetus
for this work was to develop an alternative model for CARE3
should the Ko!mogcrov method run into computational difficul-
ties. The latter method, however, proved to be highly effec-
tive for the class of structures of concern here, overcoming
most of the limitations (e.g., extremely large number of
states, time invarient transition rates) associated with time-
homogeneous Markov models. Nevertheless, the Markov investi-
gation was continued when it became apparent that these tech-
niques would be useful in determining coverage parameters
associated with intermittent faults. (An example of this is
presented in paragraph 3.3). The results of this investiga-
tion are described in an appendix to Volume II of this report.
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The coverage model to be implemented in COVRGE will be an
extension of that implemented in CARE II (Ref. i). This
coverage model has been modified to produce the (generally
time-varying) recovery rates, as required by CARE III,
rather than the recovery probabilities used in CARE II. The
model has not yet been integrated into CARE III, however,
nor has it been combined with intermittent fault models.
(The reliability model tests described in section 3 used
simplified coverage models involving either constant recovery
rates or fixed recovery delays.) Completion of the coverage
model and its integration into the CARE III structure is one
of the first tasks to be completed during phase 2.
The major task remaining to be accomplished during phase
2 is the development of CAREIN. The intent here is to provide
the user maximum flexibility in specifying the system structure,
fault models, coverage parameters, success criteria, etc., in
the simplest possible format. A general approach to this tasi[
is outlined in section 4 and detailed in Volume II of'this
report.
2.0 CARE III REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT
Four fault-tolerant systems were examined in an effort to
characterize the class of structures CARE III will be expected
to model and to estimate the kind and range of parameters
needed to describe these structures. The four systems examined
were: Boeing Aircraft Corporation's ARCS (Airborne Advanced
-- Reconfigurable Computer System, Ref. 2), SIFT (Software Imple-
mented Fault Tolerance Computer, Ref. 3) under development at
-- SRI, International, FTMP (Fault-Tolerant Multi-Processor, Ref.
4) under deve!opment at Charles Stark Draper Laboratory and
FTSC (Fault-Tolerant Spacecraft Computer, Ref. 5) under devel-
opment at Raytheon. A study was made both of the structures
-- of these systems and of the techniques used to estimate their
reliability. The results of this study are briefly summarized
-- in paragraph 2 l. Paragraph 2.2 then lists the requirements
that were imposed on the CARE III reliability and coverage
•-- models as a result of this study and due to other considerations.
2.i SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
-- 2.1.1 SIFT
The SIFT computer system consists of a number of identical
processors (containing both memory and processing elements)
interconnected by several interprocessor buses.* The Processors
are dynamically assigned to various groups, with each group
typically comprised of three processors, but in some cases as
manv as five. The looselv svnchronized Drocessors in each
group perform the same operations on the same data and transmit
*The bus structure was changed subsequent to this investigation;
the change, however, does not modify the conclusions reached
here concerning CARE III requirements.
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the results of these operations to each of the other processors
in their group. Each processor evaluates its own health and
that of the other processors in its group by comparing these
results. Faulty processors and buses are identified by
analyzing discrepancies in these results; reconfiguration takes
place whenever a majority of processors in a group concludes
that one of its elements is defective.
In CARE II terminology (Ref. i), SIFT is comprised of two
stages:* a processor stage consisting of m processors, and a
bus stage comprising n buses. The system has failed by time t
if fewer than mI processors or fewer than nI buses are still
functioning, or if a coverage failure has occurred prior to
that time.
The reliability of SIFT was estimated in Ref. 3 by using
a continuous-time Markov model with time-independent transi-
tion parameters. Coverage was taken into account be defining
a deterministic latency period TO between the occurrency of a
failure and its detection. If a second processor or bus fails
during this period, a system failure is declared. Since all
processors and buses are presumably always powered, the dor-
mancy factor is assumed to be unity.
Note that the probability of a coverage failure is a
function of the number of processors (buses) functioning at
the time of a processor (bus) failure. That is, the probability
of a second processor or bus failure, and hence a coverage
failure during the _0-second latency period depends upon the
number of processors or buses functioning at that time. Since
*The term "stage" refers to an ensemble of identical, inter-
changeable units.
the possibility is (not unreasonably) ignored that two bus
(processor) failures occur between the time that a processor
• (bus) failure occurs and the time that the failure is detected,
the coverage parameters associated with a processor (bus)
failure are independent of the number of buses (processors) in
operation at the time of the failure. Thus, the system can be
r_
modeled as a two-stage configuration, a processor stage exhib-
iting m-i modes (corresponding to the different numbers of
processors that could be functioning at the time of a new
failure), and an (n-l)-mode bus stage. It is important to
emphasize that there is no coupling between the two stages; a
mode change in the processor stage does not result in a bus-
stage mode change, and vice-versa. This simplifies the
reliability model since each stage can be treated independently.
Transient faults in the SIFT model are, like permanent
faults, of two types: processor faults and bus faults, both
having time-independent rates of occurrence. Any transient
fault can have one of two outcomes: with probability Ptr the
system recovers completely; with probability l-Ptr the system
loses the aff!icted bus or processor. The following events
are not allowed: a transient fault occurring during a latent
permanent fault; a permanent fault occurring during a still
active transient; a transient fault occurring while a previous
transient is still active.
2.1.2 FTMP
The FTMP is comprised of a set of processors, a set of
memories, and a set of buses over which processors and mem-
ories can communicate. The processors, memories, and buses
-- are each grouped into "triads." A processor triad consists
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of three tightly coupled processors all committed to the same
task; a memory triad consists of three memory modules all con-
taining the same data; and a bus triad consists of three buses
with each bus used for transmission purposes by exactly one
of the three units comprising each processor or memory triad.
The system is thus partitioned, at any given time, into a
number of processor triads and a number of memory triads, with
all processor-memory communication taking place over a common
bus triad. Each processor-bus and each memory-bus interface
(bus guardian unit) contains a voter that produces as an out-
put the majority-vote of the three inputs received over the bus
triad. Faulty processors, memories, or buses are identified
by diagnosing the pattern of discrepancies observed at these
voters.
Four different reliability models for the FTMP are
described in Ref. 4. The first involves a 146-state discrete-
time Markov model with time-invarient transition parametera.
The states are defined by the number of detected and undetected
faults in the processor modules, the memory modules, the bus
system and the bus guardian units. The Markov model was kept
to 145 states by identifying all system states involvina more
than two undetected faults or more than three total faults with
the failed state. Other approximations were also made in order
to obtain tractable transition parameters. Even so, the com-
puter time needed to obtain numerical results using this model
were such that reliabilities were determined for only the first
second of FTMP operation.
To extend these results, a simplified ll-state Markov
model was obtained by treating modules having detected failures
-- as though they were again operational and by assuming any
combination of three or more faults cause a system failure.
Numerical reliability results were then obtained for the
first 40 seconds of FTMP operation using this model.
The reliability of the FTMP for longer durations was
estimated using a combinatorial model to determine the
probability that at least P0 of P processors, M0 of M mem-
ories, and B0 of B buses are operating at time t (assuming
Ferfect coverage) and by extrapolating the coverage failure
Frobabilities obtained using the ll-state Markov model.
In a later investigation, the ll-state Markov model was
modified to determine the effect of transient faults on the
FTMP for short (i00 minute) missions. The permanent failure
states in the origina! model were replaced by intermittent
failure states in which failures healed (temporarily) at a
constant rate _ and recurred at a constant rate 6. (Once a
failure has occurred, it remains in the intermittent mode
_ either until it is detected or until it results in a system
failure.)
-- In a!l _f these models, coverage was defined in terms
of the probability that a second fault of a given type
- occurred during the exponentially distributed latency period
of the fault in question.
In CARE II terminology, then, the FTMP mode! consists of
three stages: processor, memory and bus. There are as many
operating modes as there are modules, since the recovery
Frobability is a function of the number of previous failures
in each of the three stages. Thus, the three stages are
"coupled" in that the coverage associated with a fault in
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stage i depends, in part, on the absence of faults in stage
j _ i during the latency period.
2.1.3 ARCS
The ARCS system involves a computer stage (consisting of
three or four identical computers), several sensor stages, and
several servo (actuator) stages. The non-internally-redundant
computers accept information from their associated sensors,
interchange this information over cross-channel buses, and
generate signals to their associated servo systems. The out-
puts of the (generally three) servos comprising a given stage
are voted on by a mechanical voting mechanism assumed to have
complete first-failure fault tolerance.
The computers use a combination of hardware and software
techniques to monitor their own performance and that of their
associate computers, and to identify defective sensors and
servos. Reconfigurations (following which, for example, a
servo is deactivated, or the outputs of some sensor or computer
are ignored) are effected through information passed back and
forth among the ARCS computers.
The ARCS system was modeled in Ref. 2 by breaking
it up into stochastically independent stages and then repre- --
senting each stage with a continuous-time, constant-parameter
Markov model of up to ten states. The coverages used in de-
riving the Markov transition parameters were estimated, in
some cases, by testing actual devices using a randomly selected
subset of possible faults; in other cases, coverage probabili-
ties were simply postulated Since no data were available.
-- The ARCS reliability model took into account the
peripheral devices (sensors and servos) as well as the central
computer. The ARCS architecture is such that a failure in a
redundant module in one of its stages may cause the function
-- of a module in one or more of its other stages to be lost as
well. Accordingly, provision was made whereby the user could
-- specify a "dependency" relationship among the various stages
of the ARCS configuration; i.e., the user could in effect
specify more than one definition of an operational system
configuration.
Transient and intermittent faults were bcth taken into
account in that they were allowed to influence the Markov
transition parameters. Transients affected these parameters
to the extent that they were "leaky"; i.e., the permanent fault
hazard rate was increased by a term reflecting the rate of
occurrence of transients of duration exceeding some test
interval T. Since the Markov model implemented in the ARCS
reliability evaluation program allowed unidirectional transi-
tions only, the effect of intermittent faults (causing
transitions back and forth bet_een two states) was approximated
by calculating an "effective" unidirectional transition
parameter from one of these states to the other.
2.1.4 FTSC
The FTSC (Ref. 5) is an internally redundant central
_ processor being developed for the U.S. Air Force. It is
partitioned into nine types of elements (central processing
__ unit, memory module, direct memory access unit, serial bus
interface unit, power module, timing module, configuration
control unit, circumvention unit, and hardened timer)
-- ii
interconnected by seven different bus networks (address bus,
data bus, control bus, power bus, timing bus, interrupt bus,
status bus). Each of these elements and buses is provided
with redundant spares, in various configurations depending
upon its complexity. (One element, the memory module, is
itself internally redundant as well.)
The current FTSC reliability model is a simplified, one-
mode, sixteen-stage version of CARE II. In some cases, non-
unity dormancy factors were used to account for the lower
failure rate of inactive and unpowered modules.
2.2 CARE III REQUIREMENTS
The emphasis in the previous section was on the techniques
used to estimate the reliabilities of the systems in question.
At a minimum, CARE III must provide a unified model for all
four of those systems and hence reproduce, under the appropriate
set of conditions, the results obtained using each of these
models. This, of course, is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition to place on CARE III. To be most useful, it must be
flexible enough to overcome any limitations imposed by the
above models (e.g., restrictive coverage models, limited fault
models, etc.) and at the same time sufficiently general to
allow other, as yet unspecified, fault-tolerant systems to be
modeled without introducing artificial restrictions. The
following paragraphs outline the requirements imposed on
CARE III and explain the rationale for each of these require-
ments in terms of the above objectives.
i. Capability of modeling up to at least 40 stages.
Rationale: This is specified in the CARE III Statement of
Work. Although none of the systems considered in paragraph 2.1
require as many as 40 stages, it is not difficult to conceive
of systems that do. This requirement will be satisfied in
CARE III by providing a means for concatenating independent
12
-- runs. If the coupling between stages is limited,
it will in fact be possible to model an arbitrarily large
number of stages by making repeated runs.
2. Multiple operating modes for each set of coupled
stages.
Rationale: The operating mode of a system or subsystem
is, so far as its reliability model is concerned, a function
of its structure (number of units of various types that have
to be operational for the system to function as specified) and
its coverage parameters. If the system's structure or coverage
coefficients change stochastically during its operating life-
time (e.g., if they depend upon the number of faults already
-- incurred) such changes must be reflected in its reliability
model. If a mode change in one stage precipitates a mode change
in some other stage, the two stages are said to be coupled.
(Deterministic structural or coverage parameter changes must,
of course, also be reflected in the reliability model. Such
changes are relatively easily accommodated, however, by
introducing time-dependent coverage parameters and by concatenat-
ing reliability models representing the disjoint time intervals
during which the system structure is invarient. Thus, such
mode changes impose no new constraints provided only that the
coverage parameters are allowed to be time-dependent.)
-- CARE II allowed only one mode change (two operating modes);
the exhaustion of the spares available at any one stage could
_ cause the system to change from, say, a dual-redundant to a
single-string configuration, thereby changing both the system
_ structure and the coverage coefficients associated with each
stage. Two of the systems discussed in paragraph 2.1, however,
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(SIFT and ARCS) exhibited mode changes after each new fault.
Thus, the two-mode limitation of CARE II is not acceptable for
CARE III.
3. Separate coverage model similar to that in CARE II
but capable of handling latent and intermittent faults as well
as permanent faults.
Rationale: The major advantage in keeping the reliability
and coverage models distinct (as they were in CARE II) is
that it allows the user to concentrate on each of these two
areas relatively independently and hence simplifies the task
of defining the system model. In addition, there are some
significant practical advantages (cf. Section 4) in separating
the reliability model, driven by infrequently occurring
failures, from the coverage model reflecting the much more
rapid detection, isolation and recovery events.
The need to handle both intermittent and latent faults in
the coverage model is evident from the discussion in paragraph
2.1.
4. Multiple success criteria
Rationale: As ARCS clearly demonstrates, some redundant
systems may be considered operational under any one of a number
of possible conditions. It is therefore necessary for the user
to be able to define each of those conditions and for CARE III
to calculate the probability that at least one of them occurs.
5. n-point failure mechanisms ("category 3" faults)
Rationale: Most fault-tolerant systems exhibit "n-point-
failure" mechanisms; i.e., sets of n failures (n> i) that can
disable the system eventhough spare hardware is available.
If two BGUs fai! in the enable mode in the FTMP_ for example,
14
_ the system is potentially inoperative even though spare opera-
tional modules are available. CARE II modeled such failure
_ mechanisms only for n = i. Although the probability of such
failures is generally a rapidly decreasing function of n, it
_ cannot a priori be considered negligible for all n > i. The
concept of a single-point failure must therefore be generalized
to take this into account.
6. Time-dependent hazard rates
-- Rationale: All of the reliability models considered in
paragraph 2.1 assumed constant hazard rates. There are at
-- least two reasons why it would be desirable to relax this
restriction: (i) Recent data indicate that at least in some
-- environments (space) the hazard rates are far from constant.
(2) The hazard rates associated with modules having internal
-- redundancy are not constant even if the individual component
hazard ratesare.
7. Transient faults
Rationale: Most faults are modeled either as permanent
or intermittent, the latter actually being permanent faults
that manifest themselves intermittently. Some faults may
well be transient in nature, however; e.g., faults due to
noise or those due to improperly validated software. In suoh
cases, no hardware damage has occurred and, as soon as the
cause of the fault disappears, the system can, in principle,
function as before.
_ 8. Non-unity dormancy factors
Rationale: Of the four models discussed in paragraph
2.1, only the FTSC model allowed non-unity dormancy factors.
In some cases, it is reasonable to assume that dormant (e.g.,
_- unpowered or inactive) modules may have lower hazard rates
15
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than active modules. Non-unity dormancy factors will be
defined as follows: Let P(t) be the probability that an
active unit survives until time t and let Pe(t) be the
probability that a dormant unit survives until time t. The
exponent _i is the dormancy factor.
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3.0 RELIABILITY MODEL DEVELOPMENT
Three basic mathematical approaches were considered
for development of the reliability model: (i) Extension of
the CARE II method. (2) Markov chain method. (3) A
recursion technique based on Kolmogorov's forward differential
equations.
The CARE II approach was rejected because of the large
number of operational modes needed to model some of the fault-
tolerant systems of interest. The coverage probabilities
_ in both the SIFT and the FTMP systems are functions of the
number of units still operating. Thus, each new failure
-- effectively defines a new mode of operation. As demonstrated
in the CARE II Final Report (Ref. i), the complexity of the
_ closed-form analytic expressions used in the CARE II model is a
rapidly growing function of the number of possible operating
modes. Even if transform techniques (e.g. Laplace trans-
forms) are used to eliminate the multiple integrals found in
-. these expressions, the model becomes intractable for systems
involving more than four or five operating modes.
-- Some effort was made to generalize the basic CARE II
equation (relating the probability of operating at time t
with exactly _ known failures to the failure rates, coverage
probabilities, number of active and spare elements, etc.) to
include the case in which the coverage parameters were
allowed to be functions of the number of previous failures
-- in the stage in question. This would have, in principle,
drastically reduced the number of required "system modes"
-- since a mode change would no longer necessarily be needed to
accommodate a change in the number of operating units in a
-- given stage. This effort was abandoned, however, when it
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became apparent that the cross-coupling between stage
coverages (i.e., the dependence of the coverage in one
stage on conditions in another stage) could also be a signifi-
cant factor in some cases of interest.
The term "Markov chain" in the present context denotes
the following modeling structure: The system state at any
given instant is characterized by all those parameters needed
to determine both the likelihood that it will experience some
fault at time t and the probability that it will successfully
recover from that fault. These various system states are
then interrelated through a set of transition functions repre-
senting the rates at which the system state changes from any
given state to any other state. (Thus, the transition functions
r..(t) and r.. (t) relating states S. and S. define the condi-13 31 l 3 --
tional probability densities of transitions at time t from S.
1
to S. and from S. to S respectively; cf , Figure 3 1 )3 ] i' " " "
The avionics systems to be modeled by CARE III are to be
extremely reliable; only rare combinations of unlikely events
can be permitted to cause the system to fail. Consequently,
numerous parameters are needed to characterize each state and,
in particular, its vulnerability to subsequent faults. Specifi-
cally, each state is defined not only by the number of faults
in each of its coupled stages, but by the status ef each of
these faults as well. The status of a fault is defined by all
those parameters needed to determine the system's vulnerability
to subsequent faults (e.g., detected; undetected, benign, inter-
mittent fault of a given type; undetected, active, intermittent
fault of a given type; etc.) It should not be surprising that
under these circumstances, the number of states needed to
characterize a system can be extremely large. If a system --
18
From Other States
S.
1
To Other States
Figure'3.1
General Structure of a Markov Model
-- 19
consists of n coupled stages, if the ith stage can sustain as
many as m faults and still be operational, and if the status
of each stage-i fault can be any one of £. possibilities the1
total number N of system states that have to be considered is
n £ j-I
N = H i
i=l LJ=O j
This number can be large even for relatively small parameters
£i' mi' and n. (For example, _hen n = 4, and £. = 6, m = 21
for all i, N = 614,656.)
Mathematical methods for determining the probability
that a system is in any one of its Markov states at any time t
are well known and particularly efficient solution techniaues
are available when the state transition functions r..(t) are
13
independent of t. With the Markov model just described, iu
is possible (although undesirably restrictive) to treat these
functions as time invarient, so these mathematical methods can,
in fact, be applied. Even so, these methods become computa-
tionally infeasible when the nul_er N of states becomes large,
even when advantage is taken of the fact that the number of
allowed state transitions is much less than the maximum possible
number, N(N-I). Since, as already noted, the number of states
needed to describe systems of interest here can easily exceed
105, another approach was clearly needed. (Nevertheless, a
thorough investigation was made into methods for efficient
computer manipulation of Markov model transition matrices.
This investigation was undertaken for two reasons: (i) to
provide an alternative should difficulties be encountered in
20
-- developing the preferred CARE III approach; (2) to develop
techniques that may be useful in implementing the CARE III
coverage model. The results of this investigation are sum-
marized in Volume II of this report.)
By far the most promising of the reliability modeling
techniques examined for the class of fault-tolerant systems
_4
ef concern here was one based on Kolmogorov's forward differ-
ential equations; for convenience, it will be referred to as
_he Kolmogorov Method. Several variations on this method
were postulated and examined in detail in order to determine
the most efficacious procedure for applying it to the problem
at hand. The variations considered are described in the fol-
icwing paragraphs. Before proceeding, however_ it may be
useful to outline the general approach.
As already noted, the major problem with the Markov
Method, as outlined, is the inordinately large number of states
needed to distinguish all the various fault conditions. As
_ also noted, these conditions can be specified in terms of two
sets of parameters: i) the number of faults in each of the
_ ccupled stages; 2) the status of each of these faults. The
essence of the Kolmogorov approach is in the separate treatment
_ of these two sets of parameters. That is, system states are
used to represent only the firstset of parameters; the effect
_ of the second set of parameters is reflected implicitly in the
state transition functions.
-- The separate treatment of the two sets of parameters
needed to model fault occurrence and fault recovery has two
- major advantages: i) It drastically reduces the number of
states needed to represent the system (from the previously
21
defined number N to, in the same notation,
n
NI I(mi•l)i.efromN010656statesinhe
previous example to N1 = 81). 2) It circumvents the serious
computational difficulty presented by a model that combines
in one homogeneous structure the relatively infrequent state
transitions characterized by the first set of parameters
(perhaps one fault/103 hours) and the much more frequent
transitions due to fault status changes (e.g., detection
rates of the order of seconds, intermittent fault transition
rates of the order of minutes or less, error generation rates
of the order of milliseconds).
The major disadvantages of this modeling approach are
also two-fold: i) The state transition functions are now con-
siderably more difficult to determine. They are in effect --
conditioned only on time and on the number of previous faiiures
of each type; the probability density of a transition under
these conditions can be determined only by averaging over all
possible values of the implicit parameters. 2) The state-
transition functions are necessarily functions of time, thereby
precluding from the outset the time-homogeneous Markov chain
solution techniques mentioned previously.
The first of these disadvantages is reflected in a more
complex coverage model than would otherwise be required. The
important point here, however, is that the co_)inatorial and
Markov techniques mentioned earlier can be applied at the
coverage mode! leve! as wel! as at the reliability mode! level.
Furthermore, the number of states needed to determine the
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conditional transfer functions is vastly less than the number
of states in an undifferentiated Markov model of the entire
system. Thus, the coverage model computational effort, while
greater than it would otherwise have been, is still almost
-- negligible compared to that needed to determine the state
probabilities for the system level Markov model. Inie:ffect,
-- the model has been reduced from one having N = nI xn 2 x...x n£
states to one having nI + n2 + ... + n£ states, with n.denotingl
-- the number of relevant states given that i faults have already
taken place. (The reduction is in fact more dramatic than this
-- since much of the computational effort needed to determine the
transition functions given i faults can also be used ho deter-
- mine these functions given j # i faults.)
The detailed development of the CARE III coverage model
will be undertaken in Phase 2 of this effort. As currently
invisioned, it will combine both combinatorial antiMarkov
techniques. The former will be used to determine the prob-
ability that a given combination of faults can, under a
specific set of conditions (e.g., all faults simultaneously
active) cause the system to fail; the latter will be used to
determine the probability that the specified set of conditions
does indeed obtain at any given time. Some specific examples
of this coverage modeling approach, used during Phase one as part
of the reliability model test exercise, are described in
paragraph 3.3.
-- The second of the above-mentioned disadvantages to the
modeling approach outlined here is largely overcome by basing
-- the solution techniques on Kolmogorov's forward differential
equations. The procedure for doing this is the subject of
-- the remainder of this section.
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3.1 THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT
Let Pjli(tlT) denote the conditional probability that a
w
system is in state j at time h given that it was in state
i at time T. Similarly, let P£1J, i(tl_'T) denote the
conditional probability that a system is in state £ at time
t given that it was in state j at time _ and in state i at
time T. Then, clearly, for any T< n <t,
P£1i(tlT) = _ Pjli(_IT)P£1j, i(tl_, T) (i) _
J
with the sum taken over all the (assumed finite number of}
possible intermediate states j. (If, for all T< _ < t,
P£1J, i(tI_' T) = P£1j(tl_), then equation (i) reduces to
the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation for continuous-time, discrete
state systems.)
It follows from equation (i) that
P£1i (t + Atl_) = P£1i(tlT)P£1£, i(t + Atlt, T)
(2)
+ __Pjli(tlT)P£1j, i(t + Atlt, T)
j_
?4
Let
1 - P£ (t + Atlt T)
l£1i(tlT) = lim I£, i 'AtAt _0
and
cj£1i(tlT)lj£1i('tlT)= lim P£1J, i(t + Atlt' T)
-- At
At .0
(The reason for this latter notation will become apparent
shortly.) Then, rearranging terms in eauation (2), dividing
by At and taking the limit as At _ 0 yields
_P_li(tl T)
-- (tIT) (tiT)
-- _t li £Ii
(3)
+ _ Pjli(t[T)cj£1i(tIT)lj£1i(tlT)
j_£
This set of ecuations is a form of the Kolmogorov
forward equations. It differs from the more conventional
form in that the transition parameters cj£1i(tlT)lj£1i(tlT)..
are also functions of the initial state i of the system at
time T. If the notation indicating the condition that the
system be in state i at time T is suppressed, equation (3)
can be expressed in the more convenient form
-- 25
dP£ (t)
= -P£(t)l£(t) + _/_ Pj (t)cj (t)_ (t) (4)
dt j_£ £ J£
It must be remembered in the ensuing discussion, however,
that tlletransition parameters may also be functions of the
initial conditions.
Four recursive reliability modeling methods based on
Kolmogorov's forward eauation, equation (4), were investigated
in an effort to find the most suitable application cf this
result to the class of problems of concern here. These four
methods are described in the following paragraphs.
3.1.i DIFFERENCE EQUATION FOR RELIABILITY
Let P£(t) denote the probability that the system is
operating at time t having undergone exactly £ failures.
(If it is necessary to distinguish between different types
of failures, £ will actually be a vector; e.g. £ = (i, j, k)
indicating i failures of type i, j of type 2 and k of type
3.) Let l£(t) denote the rate at which failures occur given
that the system has sustained £ failures by time t. Let
_j£(t) denote the rate of occurrence of failures ti_atwould,
if coverage were perfect, lead from state j to state £ (i.e.,
from the state characterized by j failures to that character-
ized by £ failures).
Then
lj£(t) = lj(t)
£
26
with the sum taken over all states £ which can be reached
in one transition from state j. Finally, let cj£(t) denote
-- the coverage probability associated with a failure which
would, in the event of perfect coverages, cause a transition
-- from state j to state £. (The coverage associated with a
failure occurring when the system is in state j is therefore
c (t)= cj (t)x-- 3 £ j£
£
-- with the range of summation and the term l.(t) as previously
defined.) 3
With these definitions, equation (4), rewritten in
difference-equation form
-- P£(t + At) = P£(t)(! - l£(t)At)
(5;
-- + _Pj (t)cj£ (t)I_£(t)At
J
defines a recursion, on both t and £, on the probabilities
P£(t). The probability that the system is successfully
operating at time t is then just
R(t) = _ P£(t) (6)
£sL
-- with the summation taken over all allowable states £.
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Actually, equation (5) defines a recursion on £ only if
the states can be suitably ordered. This is the case, for
example, if it is impossible to go from a state having II£II
failures (with If%If indicating the number of failed units
represented by the vector £) to a state having fewer than
II£11; i.e., if failed units never "heal"_ This would
appear to eliminate transient failures from the model. This
is not the case, however, if the coverage coefficients make
the proper distinction between "leaky" and "non-leaky"
transients.
3.1.2 DIFFERENCE EQUATION FOR UNRELIABILITY
Let P_(t) be the probability that the system would be
operating in state £ at time t were coverage perfect, let
Q£(t) = p_(t) - P£(t) and let cj£(t) = 1 - cj£(t) . Then
equation (5) can be rewritten:
Q%(t + At) = Q£(t) [i - l£(t)At]
(7)
+ _ [Q5(t) + P_(t)c. (t)]Ii (t)At
J
and the system unreliability becomes
1 - R(t) : _ Q£(t) + _P_(t) (8)
£eL £_L
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m-- with L as previously defined and L U L the set of all
%
possible states.
An interesting variation on the approach suggested by this
formulation is obtained by treating all states representing
-- system failures as terminal _ather than transient states.
This is equivalent to redefining Q£(t) as the probability
that the system has failed by time t and at the time of the
-- failure it contained exactly £ failed units. Since unit
failures occurring after the system has failed do not in
this case cause a state change, equation !7) now assumes the
-- simpler form
Qi(t+At) = Q£(t) + 7.P(t)cj£(t)lj£(t)At
-- j j
Now, however, the two probabil_ties
-- A A
Q(t) = 7 Q£(t) and P*(t) = Z- P£*(t)
no longer represent disjoint events and equation (8) becomes
an inequality rather than an equality. That is, the prolo-,_
ability Q(t) here is a measure of the event (A) that the
-- s_vstemhas failed by time t due to a coverage failure; P(t)
measures the event (B) that £ units have failed by time t.
Thus, l-R(t) = P(AUB) = P(A) + P(B) - P(AIB)P(B ) ."P(A) + P(B).
-- (It can be agreed that P(A IB) > P(A); that is, the conditional
probability of a coverage failure given that the total hUh'her
of failures exceeds some minimum must be greater than the un-
-- conditional probability of a coverage failure. Thus, l-R(t) =
P(AUB) < Q(t) + P*(t) - Q(t)p*(t).) Since clearly 1 - R(t) >
max (Q(t), P*(t)), the fact that the events A and B are not --
mutually exclusive is of potential concern only when Q(t) and
P*(t) are both small and of the same order of magnitude. Even
in this case, the unreliability would be overestimated by at
-- most a factor of two. The reduction in computational com-
plexity, potentially achievable by treating each failed state
as a terminal state, may well justify this small reduction in
-- accuracy; this possibilit}:will be exp!ored during Phase Two
of this study.
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This formulation offers a significant potential
advantage when, as is the situation of concern here, R(t)= 1
for all t of interest. In this case,
P£ (t)_ 1
£cL
and the sum of the round-off errors obtained in calculating
the individual P£(t) terms may well be of the order of the
quantity of major interest; viz: the unreliabil_ty
1 - _ P£ (t).
£cL
Under these same conditions, however, the terms Q£(t) must
be small for all ££L and the terms P_(t) must be small for
all ££L. If the round-off error associated with each of
these terms can be kept small relative to the terms them-
selves, it follows that the cummulative round-off error will
be small compared to their sum.
3.1.3 INTEGRAL EQUATION FOR RELIABILITY
Equation (4) is a linear, first-order differential
equation. This equation can be easily solved to yield:
t / 3_ (T)
e-_v I£(T)dT (T (T)1Jz )cj£ j£P£(t) dT (9)
0 e 0
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This also can be used to define a recursion on £ and t.
If the integrals in equation (9) are replaced by their
first-order approximations:
f(T)dT _ f(T)dT + f(t)At
-- 0 0
-- and if the exponentiais are replaced by the first two terms
in their power-series expansions:
-f(t)
e _ 1 - f(t)
_ equation (9) is identical to equation (5). If more
sophisticated approximations are used, however, it might
_ well be possible to achieve accuracy comparable to that
attainable with the equation (5) difference equations but
_ without the need to use such small step sizes At. This
possibility was investigated using Simpson's rule integration
_ for the integrals in equation (9) and using an existing
exponential evaluation subroutine. The results of the two
_ approaches are compared in Section 3.2.
3.i.4 INTEGRAL EQUATION ON UNRELIABILITY
If the substitutions described in paragraph 3.1.2 are
-- made in equation (9), the resulting expression assumes the
form:
-- t / tj_i£[Q cj ]
-/0 I£(T)dT j(T) + mj (T) £(T) Ij£(T)
_ Q£(t) = e _0/T dTe X£(n)dn
o (lO)
31
This formulation has the same potential advantage over that
represented by equation (9) as the equation (7) approach
has over the equation (5) approach.
3.2 EVALUATION OF THE KOLMOGOROV RECURSION METHODS
It quickly became apparent, after only a few trial
program runs, that the recursions on unreliability were
decidedly superior to those based on reliability for the
situations of interest here. Although the reliability
recursions did yield acceptable results, considerably better _
results could be obtained with comparable program execution
time (larger step sizes) using the unreliability recursions.
Consequently, the competition was quickly reduced te one
between the method described in paragraph 3.1.2 and that
described in paragraph 3.1.4.
The only approximations in the recursions develope_ in
Section 3_.iare those introduced in approximating a differential
equation by a difference equation or by approximating an
integral by a discrete summation. The modeling task is
considerably simplified, however, if one other approximation
is made in these formulations. This approximation involves
the determination of the coverage coefficients cj£(t) .
In the examples to be considered here, the coverage
coefficients are the only parameters in the reliability
model recursions that are influenced by the implicit con-
dition that the system was in state ! = 0 at time T = 0.
These terms are functions of, among other things, the probabil-
ity that any of a certain subset of failures are still latent
at the time of occurrence of the failure in question. Since
II11] failures took place in time t, it is clear that the
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-- likelihood of a latent failure at time t is a genera!ly
increasing function of the ratio [I£11/t. If no other
-- conditions were imposed, it would be relatively easy to
determine the probability that _ latent failures are present
-- at time t given that the system was in state j at time t-.
There is another condition, however: the system was still
-- operating at time t-. This condition reduces the likelihood
of certain failure sequences and hence perturbs the
-- stochastic process characterizing failure events relative
to the case when this condition does not apply. For example,
-- the fact that the system is still operating reduces the
probability that two failures occurred'within a short interval
-- of each other if a system failure would have resulted were
one of these failures latent when the other took place.
It is apparent (or at least it will become apparent once
specific examples are considered) that the effect of this
perturbation in the stochastic failure process must be highly
insignificant except, possibly, for very small values of t.
in which case all failure events are extremely unlikely_
Accordingly, this effect is ignored in the following formula-
tions. The resulting distribution of latent faults is
precisely that that would be found were no distinction made
as to whether the system was operational or not; i.e., if no
distinction was made between the state represented by the
probability Pj(t) and that represented by Qj(t). Since the
probability of being in either of these two states is P_(t)_
-- 3
therefore, the probability of a system failure at time t can
be overbounded by replacing pj (t) in equation (7) or (i0) by
P_(t) and ignoring the condition on cjz(t) just discussed3
Further, since ignoring this condition on the failure process
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presumably results in a more favorable distribution of fault
events so far as coverage at time t is concerned%, leaving Pj(t)
in equations (7) and (i0) should result in a lower bound
on the probability of system failure. In fact, as several
computer runs demonstrated, the calculated system reliability
is identical to six or seven decimal places regardless of
whether P.(t) or P_(t) is used. This of course supports the3 3
contention that the ignored condition is in fact not significant.
The following paragraphs discuss the results obtained in
applying the methods discussed in Section 3:.](primarily those
of paragraphs 3.1.2 and 3.1.4)to the FTMP and SIFT computers.
It should be emphasized here that the purpose of these
%To illustrate this, consider the following simplified situa-
tion. Suppose failures can occur only at discrete instants
of time (t = 0, i, 2, ...), that no two failures can occur
simultaneously, and that each failure is latent for exactly
one unit of time. If a second failure occurs during the
latency of a previous failure (i.e., exactly one time unit
later), the system fails. Now consider c 2 3(t = 8). If the
condition that the system is still operatlng at time t = 7 is
ignored, there are exactly (_)=28 ways in which 2 failures
could have occurred in the 8 time instants t = 0s i, ..., 7;
exactly 7 of these failure sequences result in a latent
failure at t = 8. The probability c2 3(8) of a coverage
failure is therefore 7/28 = 0.25. If'the condition in
question is not ignored, however, the number of possible
sequences is reduced to 21, 6 of which result in a latent
failure at t = 8. The probability of a coverage failure is
thus increased to 6/21 = 0.286. Note that even in this
extreme case, with t small (only 8 times the latency period),
I!£11 large (the third failure occurs after only 8 latency
periods), and with all'latent failures causing a system
failure in the event of any other failure, the effect of the
condition in question is to increase _ by 14%. Under more
realistic conditions, the effect on the coverage coefficients
should be entirely insignificant°
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-- exercise was not to model the computers themselves, but
rather to incorporate the same genera! assumptions used in
-- the previously developed models for these computers and to
compare the results thus obtained with the results obtained
-- using these earlier models.
The purpose of this effort was to judge the efficacy of
the various reliability models under consideration before
proceeding with their more detailed development. In order to
accomplish this, it was necessary to derive analytic expres-
sions for the coverage probabilities needed in the reliability
model. This task was subsequently eliminated, so far as the
user is concerned, by restructuring the reliability model.
This restructuring, and the application of the restructured
model to both FTMP and SIFT are described in paragraph 3.3.
The following paragraphs, therefore, concentrate on the
results of this reliability model comparison rather than on
w
the derivation of expressions for c..(t).
_3
3.2.1 APPLICATION TO FTMP - PERMANENT FAILURE CASE
_ The four recursions discussed in paragraphs 3o1.1, 3.1.2,
3.1.3, and 3.1.4 (henceforth to be referred to as reliability
-- models RMI, RM2, RM3, and RM4_ respectively) were first used
to model the FTMP with all failures treated as permanent.
-- The first recursions tc be programmed for this applica-
tion were RM3 and RM4. For comparative purposes, an exact
-- solution was determined analytically for the probability
P3,0,0(t) (i.e., the probability that the system is still
- operating at time t after having sustained exactly three
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processor failures, no memory failures and no bus failures).*
This exact solution was also programmed and the result used
to evaluate the accuracy of the two recursive methods. The
values obtained for t = 30 seconds, for example, when the
*The exact solution can be expressed as follows:
P3,0,0 (t) = (l-e"XPt)3 2np P- (np-2)A(I ,6p,t)
-2np (np-3)B (lp,6p,t)-4npC(ip,6p,t)
" )] (np-3) t-2n (np-3)D(1 6p t e- Ipp p' '
e-nmlmt e-nBiBt
A(1,6,t) = I le-lt ,13e-(6+21)t -31t
_ _ .le _
3(6+21) 2(6+I) (62-I2)(6+21) 6(6-I)
B(l,6,t) = 1 _ 13e-(6+I)t _ le-21t +I -3),t
6(6+I) (62-_k2)(6-21) 2(6.-I) 3(6-21)
2 -(6+I)t -21t
C(I,6,t) = 16 _ I 6e _ le +
6(6+I) (6+21) (62-I2) (6-21) 2(6-I)
12e-(6+21)t + 16e-31t
(6-I)(6+2i) 3(6-I)(6-21)
D(1,6,t) = 12 + 12e-(°+1)t _ 12e-(6+21)t- 12e-31t _
3(6+I)(6+21) (6+I)(6-21) (6-I)(6+21) 3(6-I)(6-21)
with n nm nB denoting the initial number of processors,p, , ..............
memories, andbuses, Ip, im,'_B, their respective hazard rates,
and S the detection rate for processor faults.
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-- initial configuration consisted of 15 processors, 9 memories
and 5 buses, were:
RM3: P£(t) = .26330 x 10-15
-15
RM4: P£(t) = .25575 x i0
Exact: P£(t) = .25579 x 10-15
_ Similarly, with a 15 processor, 8 memory, 4 bus initial
configuration, the results for t = 300 hours were:
-2
-- RM3: P£(t) = .64394340 x i0
-2
RM4: P£(t) = .64384685 x i0
-2
-- Exact: P£(t) = .64384684 x i0
These agreements, especially between RM4 and the exact
solution are surprisingly good, particularly when it is
recognized that the "exact" solution is also subject to
round-off error.
_ The results of the comparison between RM3 and RM4
strongly favored the latter model. Since RM2 presumably ha_
_ the same advantage over RMI that RM4 has over RM3, the
competition, as previously noted, was quickly narrowed to
_M2 and RM4.
Table 3.1 summarizes results obtained using RM2 and
-- _M4 with At = tmax!50, and RM2 with Ati= tmax/100. (A more
complete listing of the results summarized here and in the
fol!owing examples can be found in an appendix to this
report.) As can be seen, RM2 is slightly faster than RM4
-- when At is the same in the two cases° The accuracy attain-
able with RM4 seems to be somewhat better than that attain-
" able with RM2 even wllenthe latter's step size is half (and
its running time nearly double) that of the former. Note,
-- in particular, that halving the step size in the RM2 recursion
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IABLE _, I
COMPARISONOFT!!REE_IUMERICALEVALUATIONTECHNIQUES
ESTIMATEDFAILURE PROBABILITIESAND RUNNING TIMESTIME INTERVAL VS, NUMERICALEVALUATIONTECHNIQUE
I -MODELED ELAPSED TIME INTEGRAL DIFFERENCE-EQ, DIFFERENCE-EQ, VOL,2 REFERENCE
I FROMSTART (50 STEPS) (50 STEPS) (100 STEPS) TABLEA2-
i000HRS, 20HRS, ,9115504128E-08 ,4759138922E-08 ,9013134766E-08 i,4,7
i000HRS, 1000HRS, ,2693321948E-01 ,2693321885E-01 ,2693322063E-01 1,4,7
1000HRS, RUNNING 41,078SECS, 40,141SECS, 76,282SECS,
TIME
30 SECS, 30SECS, ,3410688041E-11 ,3372096536E-11 ,3391798683E-11 2,5,8
30SECS, 1200MS, ,3189783213E-13 ,1656918144E-13 ,2439316532E-13 2,5,8
30SECS, 600MS, ,8284643018E-14 -,8526508200E-22 ,4409338212E-14 2,5,8
30 SECS, RUNNING 32,866 31,094 56,244
TIME
800Ms, 600MS, ,8642938477E-14 ,8421766317E-14 ,8531124275E-14 3,6,9
800MS, ,1495029013E-13 ,1466706658E-13 ,1480876007E-13 3,6,9
16MS, ,6686304258E-].7 ,8£00221654E-33 ,3349778148E-17 3,6,9
RUNNING 32,991 ' 30,998 56,332
TIME
I I I I I I 1 i I i I J I i I I
always brings the results obtained more nearly in line with
those obtained using RM4. Note, too, the excellent agreement
between RM4 runs having very different values of tmax"
Specifically, the t = 600 ms. result obtained %_hen
t = 30 sec. agrees quite well with that obtained whenmax
t = 800 ms. Yet in the first instance, t = 600 ms. is
_ max
the first point evaluated; in the second case, it is the
37.5th point (obtained by linear interpolation between the
37th and 38th points). This close agreement clearly is
not obtained with RM2, even when At is halved.
As a result of these comparisons, it was concluded that
_ RM4 is clearly the best of the reliability modeling
approaches examined, and that it appears to be entirely
_ satisfactory, in terms of accuracy, stability and computer
running time, for the applications of interest.
-- Four computer runs were made using RM4 for purposes ot
comparison with results obtained by Draper in their mode]
-- of the FTMP. The results of these runs, with t = 800 ms.max
and 30 sec. are superimposed over results obtained by Draper
-- in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. Figure 3.4 compares
Draper's results with those obtained from two RM4 runs, one
-- with t = i0 hrs. and one with t = i000 hrs.
max max
The RM4 results on the whole compare well with Draper's
results. The reason for the discrepancy in Figure 3.2 is not
clear. It is conceivable that the discrepancy is due to a
difference in the assumed conditions under which certain combina-
tions of latent faults can cause a system failure. The fact
that Draper's model treats three or more concurrent undetected
failures as a system failure does not, however, appear to be
sufficiently restrictive to explain the difference. In any
-- 39
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-- case, the two resul_s agree to within about 20%.
The agreement between the results obtained with RM4
and those obtained with Draper's ll-shate Markov model
(Figurei3.3) are remarkably good. The agreement between
the two sets of results in Figure 3.4 is also quite good,
the difference possibly attributable to the difficulty in
plotting on a gridless graph.%
-- 3,2.2 APPLICATION TO SIFT
_ Four different cases were investigated using RM4 to
model SIFT. The first three cases (cases la, ib and ic) all
_ modeled the computer in a permanent fault environment;
variations were introduced in order to gauge the sensitivity
_ of the model to what appeared %o be relatively minor
perturbations. Case la was postulated to reflect those
_ conditions imposed in SRI's reliability model of SIFT. In
that model, buses are not permitted to fail while a processor
failure is still latent and processors cannot fail while a
bus failure is latent. In Case ib, this restriction is
%For the record, it should be mentioned that the analytical
_ expression for coverage used for Table 3.1 was not identical
to that used for Figures 3.2 _.3.3and 3.4 In the former
case, the recovery rate associated with a processor or
_ memory was equated to the weighted average of the unit's
recovery rate and those of its associated BGU's. In
the latter cases, the slightly more cumbersome weighted
_ average of the corresponding recovery time distributions
was used. The difference in the results obtained in the
two cases was smal! and in no way affects the conclusions
_ gleaned from Table o3.1. The change was made before the
results plotted in Figures 3.2 3.3 and 3.4 were obtained
since the latter recovery model°more accurately represents
_ that postulated by Draper.
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removed, but neither of these two events (bus failure during
failed processor latency or vise-versa) causes a system
failure. This restriction is also removed in Case ic, but
here either event does cause a system failure.
The fourth SIFT case (Case 2) involved a coverage model
w
similar to that used in Case ib, but the fault environment
was changed to reflect SRI's transient fault model.
The results of these four investigations are summarized
in Table 3.2 as are the corresponding results obtained by SRI.
As can be seen, the results obtained using RM4 agree remarkably
well with those obtained by SRI. The fact that the Case la
and Case ib results are nearly identical demonstrates that
the restriction imposed by SRI in their model is indeed
benign. This would be only slightly less true even if the
recovery from one type of failure were adversely affected by
a latent failure in a unit of the other type (Case ic).
3.2.3 APPLICATION TO FTMP - INTERMITTENT FAULTS
The CARE III reliability model was used to estimate the
reliability of the FTMP in the presence of intermittent
faults. The intermittent fault model used was that defined
by Draper. That is, when a fault first occurs, it is in a
"bad" state, i.e., a state in which its effects are manifest.
It then switches between bad states and "good" states (in
which the fault is totally benign) at the constant rates B
(good-to-bad) and _ (bad-to-good). A fault can be detected
only when it is in a bad state; the fault detection rate is
then a constant _ (which may be different for the different
medule types).
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TABLE3,2 SIFTMODELINGRESUtT_SS(CF, VOL 2, TABLES #2-54 THROUnH 65
T TRANS, EXP, CASE1A CASE1B CASElC CASE2 SRInp nb SECS,
" - , , -, i i i
10 5 I0 No -8 2.4863013332,4861769002,762068196 2,50
9 4 10 No -8 1.988342096 1.988242157 2.186894736 .2.00
8 3 i0 No -8 4.5400324214.5400324214.675449311 4,56
10 5 0.1 YES -10 2,511510104 2.55
9 4 0.1 YES -10 2,061165614 2.10
i
8 3 0,1 YES -8 3,641260227 3.65
J
PARAMETERS'.
.o
u_ hop 10 hour
_'ob = 10 -5/hour
r : 0.1
P
r = 1b
P tr -- 0.9
The results obtained with the RM4 model are listed in
Table 3.3 along with the results obtained by Draper using
their Markov model. (To enable comparison, the parameters
used in the RM4 model for a, 8, 6, I and t were precisely
those used by Draper.) The column labeled CARE III, Form i,
shows the RM4 reliability predictions when no restrictions are
placed on the number of faults that can be simultaneously
present in the system. As can be seen, the reliabilities
predicted by _M4 are generally very close to those predicted
by Draper, the difference between the two predictions, however,
increasing as B decreases. It was conjectured that these
differences were due to two basic differences in the CARE III
and Draper models: First, the Draper model did not allow more
thantwo faults to be present at the same time, even if some
of these faults were in the "good" state. Any such situation
was treated as a system failure. The RM4 model places no
restriction on the number of coexisting faults so long as
these faults are not by themselves catastrophic (e.g., simul-
taneous "bad" faults in two processors in the same triad).
The second difference is due to the fact that the _44 model
treats as a system failure at time t any combination of faults,
first appearing at time t, that eventually cause a system
failure even though the actual failure may occur at some time
t' > t. When 8 is small and a large, faults spend most of
their time in the good state. Thus, there can be a significant
delay between the time a fault occurs and the time that it,
in combination with some other intermittent fault, produces an
actual failure. Since the RM4 model treated a system as being
in a failed state if it contains a combination of faults that
will eventually prove fatal, it is somewhat pessimistic
46 °. .
-- relative to a model in which such faults are not counted until
they actually occur.
The first of these differences is thus due to a restriction
on the Draper model, the second due to a restriction on the
CARE III model. In order to overcome this latter restriction,
a modification was made in the integrand used in the Form 1
version of RM4 described in paragraph 3 .1.4. This modified
version of RM4, called Form 2 and discussed in detail in
paragraph 3.3, does take into account the delay between the
occurrence of a fault and the resulting system failure. The
results obtained with this model are also plotted in Table
3.3. As can be seen, the differences between the Form 1 and
Form 2 reliability estimates can indeed be significant when
Finally, in order to determine the significance of the
Draper model restriction, the same restriction (more than two
concurrent faults treated as a system failure) was placed on
the Form 2 version of _M4. The results obtained with this
restricted model (Form 2R) are tabulated in the third column
of Table 3.3. A comparison of these results with those
obtained by Draper (fourth column in Table 3.3) provides strong
support for the conjecture concerning the differences between
the Form 1 model and Draper's model.
-- It is believed that in most realistic situations, the
difference between the reliabilities predicted by the Form 1
-- and Form 2 models will be insignificant. It is not possible,
at this point, to conclude that this difference will be
-- insignificant in all cases of interest, however. Accordingly,
CARE III will implement both models, thereby allowing the
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Table3 .3
FTMP INTERMITTENT FAULT MODEL RESULTS
(cf. Vol. 2, Tables A2-18 Through 53)
Failure Probability (x 10-8)
CARE III CARE III CARE III
O I B Form 1 Form 2 Form 2R Draper Model
i0 1 1.1181 1.1161 1.1218 1.124
i0 i0 1.2049 1.2041 1.2046 1.207
I0 i00 1.1720 1.1718 1.1720 1.174
i0 1000 1.1274 1.1274 1.1275 1.129
[00 1 1.0925 1.0054 1.2058 1.2073
L00 i0 1.9392 1.9072 1.9219 1.924
_00 100 1.6614 1.6585 1.6591 1.661
.00 i000 1.2182 1.2181 1.2183 1.220
00 1 0.9749 0.4239 1.4593 1.46
00 i0 5.5057 3.7975 4.2295 4.22
)00 I00 6.2531 6.1513 6.1668 6.!7
_00 i000 2.1208 2.1198 2.1203 2.12
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-- user to decide whether or not the more accurate reliability
prediction afforded by Form 2 justifies its increased running
-- time. (Form 2, when applied to FTMP, requires about three
times as much CPU time as does Form i.)
3 .3 RELIABILITY MODEL STRUCTURE
Preliminary evaluation of the various reliability modeling
techniques under consideration was accomplished by defining
analytically the coverage functions needed for the test cases
described in the previous paragraphs. This task can be
arduous, however, and severely restricts the coverage model that
can be accommodated. The reliability model was therefoze
restructured, both to increase its generality and to enable it
to use coverage parameters generated by a coverace model of
the sort implemented in CARE II. The new structure distinguishes
among inputs defining the system structure, inputs specifying
-- the underlying fault models and coverage-model-generated inputs
characterizing the system's response to various categories of
faults. This structure is described in detail in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
3 .3.1 SUBSYSTEM CHARACTERIZATION
The reliability model to be described here is designed
to model the reliability of a subsystem consisting of some
arbitrary number of stages. The system reliability is then
determined by taking sums of the products of the reliabi!ities
of appropriate sets of subsystems multiplied by the probability
that no category 3 faults have occurred (cf. section 2). This
!ast procedure, while relatively straightforward, has not yet
been implemented and hence will not be discussed here.
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(Combining subsystem reliabilities to determine the system
reliability clearly requires knowledge of the various success-
ful system configurations as interpreted by CAREIN. Accordingly,
implementation of this operation has been deferred until after
CAREIN has been more fully defined.) The discussion here
concerns the task of modeling the reliability of arbitrary
subsystem configurations.
Each stage in a subsystem consists of some number of
identical modules or units; since the subsystem is fault-
tolerant, it can presumably continue to operate successfully
even after some of these units have failed. The probability
that the subsystem recovers from a fault (i.e., its coverage
for that fault), however, may depend upon many factors,
including both the number of detected faults and the number of
undetected faults in other modules in the same subsystem.
(If the coverage associated with a fault in one stage is a
function of the number of faults in some other stage, the two
stages are said to be coupled.)
For notational convenience, each stage will be indexed by
a Latin letter. Stage x, for every x, is subject to faults,
each of which be!ongs to some category xi, i = i, 2, ....
The subsystem state is represented by a vector L = (...£Xl ,
£x2' "''' £Xm' £YI' £Y2' ...), £xi indicating the number of
stage x units that have experienced a category xi fault, etc.,
with each stage and each fault category thus represented. The
parameter £x represents the total number of faulty stage x
units, _£= (''" £x' £y' "'') is a vector whose components
indicate the number of faulty units of each type, and
x
5O
the total number of faulty units. Similarly, the vector
= ('''_xI' _x2' "''' _x ' _YI' _Y2' "'') designates them
number of latent faults in each category. (A fault is called
_ latent if it has not yet been isolated.)
In addition to the preceding categorization, faults are
-- also classified in accordance with their effect on the subsystem
of concern at the time of their occurrence. Specifically,
-- faults are divided into three classes: (i) Subcritical faults.
A fault is said to be subcritical if it, by itself, cannot
-- cause a subsystem failure in the absence of subsequent faults
(e.g., the first processor fault in SIFT or FTMP). (2) Critical
-- faults. A fault is called critical if it, in combination with a
pre-existing latent fault, may eventually cause the system to fail
-- even in the absence of subsequent faults (e.g., certain processor
faults in SIFT or FTMP while a previous fault is stil! undetected).
-- (3) Supercritical faults. A fault is designated supercriticai if
its occurrence causes the subsystem to fail immediately, possibly
-- but not necessarily, as a result of pre-existing faults (e.g.,
faults causing single-point failures).
If a category yj fault is critical in the presence of a
pre-existing latent category x. fault, the subsystem is said
to be in an xiYj-critical state. Such a state is possible,
for example, when faults (or their effects) are intermittent
in nature. Faults of this sort will be said to be either active
(i.e., capable of generating errors) or benign (not active). A
subsystem in an xiYj-critical state wil! fail in the absence of
other faults, if, and only if, both faults are simultaneously
active. (This statement effectively defines the terms "active"
and "benign.") It will be assumed that any other fault occurring
while the subsystem is in a critical state will also cause it to
fail. (The significance of this assumption is discussed later.)
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3.3.2 SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY MODEL
Table 3.4 defines the inputs needed for the restructured
Form 1 and Form 2 reliability models. The various inputs are
divided into three categories: i) those provided by the user
in defining the subsystem configuration; 2) those defined by
the user in selecting fault models; and, 3) those determined
by the coverage mode!. Table 3.5 defines both mathematically
and in words the functions of these inputs evaluated by CARE3
(cf. section 3) and used to define the integrand in the RF4
version of the Kolmogorov recursion.
The RM4 recursion can be expressed in terms of these
functions as follows (cf. equation i0) :
t -A£(t T)Q£_(t)= e -- ' K£_(T)dT (ii)
0
with A£_(t,T)= / tx£(_)dn._ The Form l version of K£(T) can
T
be expressed as
Q£_-CyK£ (T) : [ (T) + P__£y(T)Cyj(T)](n -£ +i)I (T) (12)
-- _ Y Y Y:_
Yj
with £_-Sy= (... £x' £y-l, £z, ...) and with
I2Cyj(T) = Dyj(£_-_y,T)+ Bxi" yj(__-_y,T)gl(T,xi, yi) (13)
xi
EQuation (ll) is identical to equation (10) but with a slight
change in notation to emphasize the relationship between
2' .
-- Tablel3.4
CARE3 INPUTS
Source Function Definition
User: b (_, £) Probability that a category yj
configuration xi'Yj fault would place the system
_ description in an xi, y_-critical state
given that _he total number of
faults and the number of latent
-- faults of each category, just
prior to the occurrence of the
category y. fault are defined
-- by £ and _ respectively.
dyj(_, £) Probability that a category yj
-- fault would be supercritical
given _ and £.
-- n Number of initially function-
x ing stage-x modules.
-- mx Minimum number of functioning
stage-x modules needed for the
system or subsystem to function.
User: qx. (t)dt Probability that a category xi
_ fault model l fault occurs in a given stage
selection x module in the interval (t,
t+dt).
Coverage model Pl(tIT,xi) Probability that a category xi
outputs fault is active but undetected
-- at time t given that it occurred
at t_me T.
P2(tIT,xi) Probability that a category x.
fault is benign but undetecte_
at time t given that it occurred
-- at time T.
_3
Table 3.4 (Cont.)t
Source Function Definition -
Coverage model p(tlT, xi, yj) Probability that any x.y_-
outputs critical state, entere_ _t --
time T, persists until time t
(i.e., neither fault has been
detected nor has a subsystem
failure occurred).
q(tlT, xi, yj)dt Probability that a systemfailure occurs in the interval
(t, t+dt) as the result of an
xiYj-critical state entered at -
_im_ T •
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-- state transitions and the fault category. (Note that the
summation here is over all fault categories.) Equation (13)
-- expresses the coverage failure probability in terms of the
functions defined in Table 3.5. That is, the probability of
-- a coverage failure is just the probability that the fault in
question forces the subsystem into a supercritical state
-- plus the probability that the fault forces it into an xiYj-
critical state which eventually causes it to fail.
The Form 2 expression for K£(T) is
" _ (T) + P__e (T)(C (T) + ACT l£-ey))]lyj(T)K£(T) = [Qz-E
_ -- yj -- y -- y Yj
-- + A'(T 19,)P_(T) (14)
m
-- Here c (T) is as defined in equation (13) but with
Yj
gl(T, xi, yj) replaced by g2(T, Xi, yj). This reflects the
fact that in the Form 2 recursion, a subsystem failure is not
counted until it actually occurs. Thus, a fault forcing the
subsystem into a critical state does not actually cause the
system to fail at that time unless the pre-existing fault is
active. The term A' (TI9,) accounts for subsystem failures
occurring at time T as a consequence of previously entered
critical states that did not immediately cause a failure.
The term A(TI£-_ ) reflects the fact that any third fault
_-. -- y
occurring while the subsystem is in a critical state is
assumed to cause it to fail.
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Table 3 .5
CARE3 FUNCTIONS
Function Mathematical Expression . Definition
r (t) 1 Itx. - j qx. (T)d_ Probability that a given stage
1 0 i x module has not experienced a
category x. fault by time t1
r (t) H r (t) Reliability of a stage xX X.
i l module
1 (t) qx (t)/rx (t) Rate of occurrence of categoryX 0 0 °
1 l 1 x. faults in a given operational
stage x module
l£(t)_ _ (nx - £x)_Ix. (t) Rate of occurrence of faults
x i i in the_(nx - £x) modules
x
that are fault-free at time t-
f t , (T)dT Probability that a given stageaxi(t) Ps(tlT xi)r_(T)Ixi x module has a category x.
,1
0 latent fault at time t g_ven
that it has experienced some
1 - r (t) fault by time tx
[Ps(t[ T, x i) --Pl(tIT, xi) + P2(tIT, xi.)]
l I I ! 1 1 I 1 _ l 1 I 1 1 l ] l l
Table 3 .5 (Cont.)
Function 1 Mathematica! Expression Definition
a (t) _ a (t) Probability that a given
X _ X.
i l stage x module has a latent
fault at time t given that it
has experienced some fault
by time t
P(Uxl£x, t) £ 1(l-a (t))£x-_x a_x" (t)x.l Probability that a subsystem-- X X l
contains._x stage x latent
(£x - _x)l i _x.! faults glven that it has
l £x faulty stage x modules
_ P(UI£, t) _ P(_xl£x, t) Probability that a system
x having _ faulty modules has
latent faults
D (£, t) _d (_, £)P(_I£, t) Probability that
Yi - -- Yi .... containing £ faultsasystemwould be
in a superc_itical state were
a category Yi fault to occur
at time t
B (1, t) _b £
xiY_3_ _xiYj(_' )P(_I£,_t) Probability that a systemcontaining £ faults would
_. enter an x.v.-criticalstate
i'"
were a category yj fault tooccur at time t
Table 3 .5 (Cont.)
Function Mathematical Expression Definition
t
g2 (t' xi) Pl (tIT' xi)rx(T)Ix.(T)dt Probability that a category
l x. fault is active at time1
0 t given that it _ latent at
time t
a (t) (i - r (t))
X. X
1 u
gl(t, xi) 1 - [l-g2(t, xi)] [i -/ q(Tlt, xi' yj)dT] Probability, given that a
t system enters an x.ya-critical
state at time t, t_a_ this
event eventually causes a
system failure
!tA(tl_) (ny-£y+l) B (_-_y,T) Probability that a systemxiYj - having £ faults is in a critic_
xi,Y j 0 state at time t
(...£ , h -1, £ ..
x y z
qyj (T) (!-g2(T , x')}P(tl_'l xi' yj)d_
t
A'(tl£) _ (n-£ +l) / B (£-_ ,T)-- y y xiYj - y Rate at which systems having£ faults fail at time t due
xi,Yj 0 to critical fault conditions
qyj(r) (l-g2(T, xi))q(tlT, xi, yj)dT
I I I I _ I i I 1 I I I
-- There are several assumptions implicit in these expressions
which should be noted:
i. It is assumed that a:faulty module can be character-
ized by the first fault it experiences, although the possibility
of subsequent faults is not excluded. (See, for example, the
expression for a (t) in Table 3.5.) If a second fault does
x
occur, it could have one of three effects: a) it could
shorten the latency period; b) it could cause the subsystem
to fail only if the first fault is still latent; c) it
could cause the subsystem to fail even if the first fault
has been detected.
The first of these effects can be accounted for in the
coverage model, the second by adding a term to the recursion
__ integrand K£(t) to account for that possibility, and the
third can be modeled as a "category 3" failure. It is
_ proposed, however, to ignore the first effect and to combine
the second and third effects in estimating the probability
of a category 3 failure. The rationale for this is as
follows: The likelihood of a second failure during the
_ latency period of a previous failure in the same module is,
in most instances, entirely negligible. In any event, the
- approach just described overbounds the subsystem failure
probability. (Ignoring the reduced latency caused by a
_ second fault is clearly pessimistic. Treating the second
effect in a separate category results in some "double count-
_ ing"; i.e., a single fault is allowed to cause the subsystem
to fail twice, once as a result of a second failure in the
_ same module and again as a consequence of a failure in some
other module.) The increase in the failure probability
estimate as a result of such approximations is clearly
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insignificant for all cases of practical interest. Thus,
while more exact expressions could be relatively easily
incorporated into CARE3 and COVRGE to account for such
events, their minor importance does not appear to justify
the added complexity.
2. Critical states are defined only for pairs of latent
faults. It is possible, for example, to define an xiYjZk-
critical state in which a failure occurs only if all three
faults are simultaneously active. None of the fault-tolerant
systems examined thus far, however, have exhibited such
failure mechanisms. Thus, while the reliability model struc-
ture described in the preceding paragraphs could readily
accommodate a more general critical-state definition, the
resulting added complexity does not seem to be justified.
3. Any new fault occurring while the subsystem is in a
critical state causes it to fail. In many cases this is in
fact not true; an arbitrary fault does not necessarily cause
the subsystem to fail even when it is in a critical state.
The purpose of making this assumption was, of course, to
eliminate the need to account for even more complicated
fault patterns involving, for example, simultaneous xiYj-
and X.Zk-critical states Once again, the probability of
such events is small, and the complexity needed for more
precise estimation does not seem to be justified.
(It should be noted that the restriction under discussion
here is considerably less severe than the restriction that
three simultaneous latent faults cause a failure, as is
evident from the results in paragraph:3.2).
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__ 3.3.3 SPECIALIZATION FOR FTMP AND SIFT
The input parameters used for the FTMP and SIFT test
-- cases discussed in paragraph 3.2 are listed in Table _.6. The
FTMP model used for intermittent faults recognized only three
rather than five fault categories; in this case the input
parameters are as defined in Table 3.6 but with £P2 = £m2 =
_p2 = _m2 = 0.I.
The definition of these parameters is relatively straight-
forward. The functions °M0, NO and N 1 are just the probabilities
that no two modules in any FTMP processor or memory triad
both contain latent faults, that no active bus contains a
latent fault, and that exactly one active bus contains a
latent fault, respectively. Thus, bplP2(_, £) for example, is
the probability that no two processors or memories in any
triad contain latent faults, that no active bus contains a
latent fault, and that, should a category P2 fault occur, it
would affect a processor in a triad already suffering from a
latent category Pl fault. Similarly, the parameter bpb(_, £)
is the probability that no two processors or memories in any
triad contain a latent fault, that no active bus contains a
latent fault, that all memories having latent faults and all
but one processor having a latent fault use the same bus, and
that that bus is the one to be affected should a bus fault
Occur.
One class of fault situations in the FTMP requires
special consideration. Suppose one of the active buses con-
tains a latent fault, that all processors and memories
-- containing latent faults use that bus and that at least one
processor does contain a latent fault. Then a new processor
_ fault affecting the triad already containing one latent fault
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iTable 3 .6a
FTMP INPUT PARAMETERS *
L = (£Pl ' ' ' £b)' £P2 £ml £m2
£ = (£ £m' £b) £ = £ + £ £ = £ + £
-- P' P Pl P2 m mI m2
= ( ' ' ' ' _b) _p + _m = +
-- UPl NP2 Uml Nm2 = UPl _P2 Nml Nm2 -
n
Let
1 _x = 0, 1
_0(Nx' £x) = (nx-£x+_x-3)(nx-£x+_x-6)'''(nx-£x+_x-3(Nx-l))
(nx-£ +Nx-I) (nx-£ ....x x+Nx-2) (nx-£x+Nx-(Nx-l)) NX_I
N0(_b, £b) = (nb-£b)(nb-£b-l)(nb-£b-2)
(nb-£b+Nb)(nb_£b+Ub_l)(nb_£b+Nb_2)
3(nb-£b) (nb-£b-l)Nb
Ni(_b, £b) =
(nb-£b+Nb)(nb-£b+Ub-l)(nb-£b+Nb-2)
M0(U, £) = M0(_p, Zp)M0(Nm, £m)
Then (for x. = PI' P2' ml' m2" x = p, m):l w
2_]x.
b (Z £) = i M0(_, £)N0(Jb £b)x.x. --'-- n -£i ] x x
* See "List of Symbols" for verbal definitions.
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2Nx. Nm-i
bx b(_, £) = I (1) Np+l nb-£b M0(U, £)N0(Nb, £b)
2 nx-£x-2Nx (1) Zp+Zmbbx. (_-'£--)= 3 n-£ M0(N' £)NI(Nb' £b)l X X
{2nb_£b NI(_b, £b) _p = Um = 0_ bbb(__,£_)= 0 otherwise
b (N, £) = b (N, £) = 0
, pim. -- _3 miPj
2Zx. Np+_m
- 'x. n-£ M0(N' £)N1('€b, £b)l X X
0 Np+Nm=0 ,
db(_, £) =
-- 3[ Up+Urn ]nb_£b 1-(}) - 2(Np + Nm) ()) NP+Nm N0(Ub, £b)
2 (3)_p+Zm NI(Ub, £b) ] M0(N, £)
_ + nb--£b I --
-- _p + _m > 0
l (t) = I ; I (t) = Ibx. x. b
-- 1 1
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Table3.6b
SIFT INPUT PARAMETERS *
Case la: L = £ = (£p, £b) £ = (_p, _b)
1 _ = (i, 0)
b (_, £) =pp -- _ 0 otherwise
bpb(_, £) = bbp(_, _£)= 0
i = (0,i)
bbb(_, £) = _
0 otherwise
dxy(_, £) = 0 all x, y
i (t) = I l (t) = Ibp p b
Cases lb, 2 (two independent subsystems):
L = £ = £ L = £ = £b
_ _ p -- _
PP _ € 1 (_' £) = _ _ 1
o_
d (_, £) = 0pp dbb(_, £) = 0
I (t) = 10pS I (t) = 10bSP b
s = 1 + r(l-Ptr) (r = 0 for case ib)
* See "List of Symbols" for verbal definitions.
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Table 3.6b (Cont.)
-- Case lc
Same as case la except:
I 1 _ = (i, 0)
bpb(g' £) = I 0 otherwise
-- I1 _ = (0, i)bbp(_' £) = 0 otherwise
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creates two critical situations: a bpS-critical fault and a
piPj-critical fault. Although such an event does not
necessarily cause the system to fail, it was elected to treat
all such events as fatal and hence to reflect their probabil-
ities in the dx(_, £) parameters. Since these are clearly
events of relatively low probability, the added complexity
needed to account for the possibility that the system could
recover from them was not felt to be justified. Treating all
such events as system failures, of course, again overbounds
the true failure probability. The parameters dpi(_, £) and
dmi(_, £) thus account for the event just described. The -
parameter db(_, £) is the probability either that at least
two buses are used by memories or processors containing --
latent faults or that one bus and at least one memory or
processor contains a latent fault and that, when a new bus
fault occurs, it affects an active bus. Again both events
produce a pair of critical fault situations.
The SIFT parameters shown in Table 36 are largely
self-explanatory. The first three cases (cases la, ib and ic)
differ only in the nature of the coupling between the two
stages (cf. paragraph 3.2). The fourth case allows transients
to occur at a rate r times the permanent fault rate. Since
the probability of a "leaky" transient is 1 - Ptr and since
leaky transients do not produce coverage failures, the
probability that an arbitrary fault produces a critical fault
situation is reduced by the probability i/[i + r )] that(l-Ptr
the fault is a leaky transient.
In addition to the parameters specified in Table 3 .6, the
CARE3 model must have access to the functions, defined in
Table 2.5, used to characterize coverage. Since COVRGE has
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not yet been implemented, these functions were generated by
hand. These functions are easily defined in the permanent
-- fault case:
-- Pl(tlT, xi) = 1 0< t-T _T 0 SIFT
0 otherwise
-- P2(tlT, xi) = 0
-- p(tlT, xi, yj) = 0
q(tlT, xi, yj) = a(t)
with 6xi the FTMP fault detection rate, TO the SIFT detection
delay, and _(t) the Dirac delta function.
In the FTMP intermittent case, the first two of these
functions are defined by a three-state Markov mode! and the
last two by a five state Markov model, as shown in Figure 3.5.
-- If Pij(tlT) represents the probability of being in state i at
time t given that the system described by the three-state
-- Markov model was in state j at time T, and if P..(tit) isl]
similarly defined for the five-state model, then
Pl(tIT, x) = Pll(tlT)
- p2(ti ,x) = P21(tl )
p(tlT, x, y) = Pll(tlT) + P21(tlT) + P31(tI%)
q(tlT, X, y) = 8[Pll(tlT) + P3l(tl_:)]
i •
ACTIVE
x
a
3.
DETECTED
•
BENIGN
m
a) Single-fault Markov model
FAULT4
x BOTH
1 V 2 BENIGN 3 x BEN _
y ACTIVE
w
' .l_ ,8
SYSTEM5
FAILURE
b) Double-fault Markov mo
Figure 3.5 INTERMITTENT FAULT MODEL
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The functions Pij(tlT) and Pij(tlT) are readily determined
either by hand (the first function involves solving a
-- quadratic equation, the second a cubic) or by using one of
the techniques described in Appendix "..
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3.4 PROGRAMMING APPROACHES FOR SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY MODEL
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION
The following paragraphs describe the techniques usedi
to program the reliability model RM4 postulated in paragraph
3.1.4. For illustrative purposes, the parameters and
dimensions discussed are those used for the FTMP model. As
will become apparent, however, these parameters and dimensions
can be readily modified as required to accommodate other
situations.
3.4.2 COMPUTATION OF Q£(t) RECURSIVELY
In order to compute the probabilities Q£(t) recursively
where £ . (i, j, k)%, an array must be defined for the Q£(t)
probabilities so that Qi-l, j, k (t)' Qi, j-l, k(t) and
Qi, j, k_l(t) can be accessed when computing Qi, j, k(t) . --
If NP = no. of processors = 15; NPS = no. of processor
survivors = 2
NM = no. of memories = 9; NMS = no. of memory survivors = 2 --
NB = no. of buses = 5; NBS = no. of bus survivors = 2
ITMAX = maximum no. of time steps = 50
QLT = array representing Q£(t), then
the array QLT must be dimensioned
tFor purposes of this example, £ is a three-dimensional vec-
tor, £ = (i, j, _), with i _enotinq the number of faile_
processors, j the number of failed memory units and k the
number of failed buses.
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_ (NP - NPS + i, NM - NMS + i, NB - NBS + i, ITMAX)=(14, 8, 4,
51), which includes 0 processor failures, 0 memory failures,
_ 0 bus failures and time 0.
The immediate requirement then becomes the definition of
a loop structure within the program for computing Q£(t) so that
all required probabilities have been previously computed and
stored in the array. For example, when computing Q£(t) for
_ (3, 2, i), Q2 2 1(t)' Q3 i, 1(t) and Q3 2 0(t) mustl ! f ! l
have been previously computed and stored in the QLT array.
-- Let II, JJ, KK, IT be the indices into the QLT array
representing Qi (t) The basic structure in FORTRAN is, j, k
-- then as shown on the following page.
1 L
C Basic Fortran Algorithm
C
NPPI = NP + 1
NMPI = NM + 1
NBPI = NB + 1
DO i00 KK = i, NBPI
DO 100 JJ = i, NMPI
DO i00 II = i, NPPI
C
I = IIMI = II - 1
J = JJMI = JJ - 1
K = KKMI = KK - 1
DO 75 IT = i, ITMAX
C Compute Q (II, JJ, KK, IT) using
C Q (IIMI, JJ, KK, IT), Q (II, JJMI, KK, IT),
C Q (II, JJ, KKMI, IT) where computing subroutines
C use I, J and K
75 Continue
C
i00 Continue
C
This structure would compute the state probabilities in
the sequence as shown on the following page.
Indices Example
QLT, L _ (II, JJ, KK) Reauired States
1 1 1
2 1 1
3 1 1
NPPI 1 1
1 2 1
2 2 1
3 2 1 (2, , i), (3, i, i), (3, 2, 0)*
NPP1 NMP1 1
1 1 2
2 1 2
3 1 2
t • •
NPPl
13 6 3 (12_6, 3), (13, 5, 3,), (13, 6, 2)
NPPI NMPI NBPI
-- * A state vector with an index of 0 is defined as havinq 0
probability because a 0 index represents a negative component
in the state vector (i, j, k), and hence desiqnates a non-
- existent state•
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Clearly all state Drobabilities will have been previously
defined and stored in QLT array so that they are available when
required.
Several problems occur if QLT is dimensioned and computed
in this manner:
i. CDC Fortran Extended allows a maximum of 3 array
declarators. Therefore the statement:
DIMENSION QLT (14, 8, 4, 51)
is an illegal declaration and will not compile.
2. The amount of memory required for such an array
would be enormous:
14 x 8 x 4 x 51 words, i.e., 22,848 words
3. Extending the model ho include, for example, I/O
modules would cause a problem because this would
reauire an added dimension to the array (if
such a dimension were legal). This would also
increase the size of the QLT array even further.
4. Unnecessary computation of state probabilities
would result--namely those which are so small
that they have no affect upon the resultant
probability. For example, the probability
associated with state (13, 6, 3), i.e., 13
failed processors, 6 failed memory modules and 3
failed buses by time t may be too small to effect
the system probability as a whole.
The solution to Droblem 1 is to create a maDDing of
(i, j, k)----nwhich will reduce the QLT array to 2 dimensions:
QLT(NMAX, IT). This will also solve problem 3; extending the
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model from (i, j, k)----nto (i, j, k, m)----nwould be a
relatively minor programming enhancement. The only part of the
-- program to change would be the mapping routine--plus model
changes due to the addition of vector component m. This
dimension solution, however, has no effect upon the size of
the QLT array. The dimension statement now becomes
DIMENSION QLT (448, 51) and would require the same amount of
storage as previously.
The solution to problems 2 and 4 would be to modify the
basic loop structure defined above so that:
a. The state probabilities are computed in a
-- flow from largest to smallest_ this
enables the program to halt execution at a
-- point where the probabilities no !onger affect
the result;
-- b. Only those probabilities actually needed to
calculate the current state probability have
to be stored in array QLT at any one time,
thus reducing its size.
The following chart lists the computational flow required
versus the basic computational flow. Each set consists of all
permutations of vectors where the largest component of any
vector is the set number. Vectors with components all less
than the current set number were defined in previous sets; the
probabilities associated with these vectors are not recomputed.
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COMPUTATIONAL FLOW Or STATE VECTORS
CHART 1
BASIC COMPUTATIONAL MODIFIED COMPUTATIONAL
FLOW FLOW WITH SETS EXAMPLE REQUIRED STATES
II JJ KK II JJ KK II-i JJ KK, II JJ-i KK, II JJ KK-I
1 1 1 Set 1 1 1 1_...._ -
2 1 1 Set 2 1 1 1
3 1 1 2 1 1 (i, i, i), (2, 0, i)**, (2, i, 0)**
4 1 1 1 2 1
5 1 1 2 2 1
6 1 1 1 1 2_
7 1 1 2 1 _ _-
8 1 1 1 2 _
1 1 2 2 2, 11
•_ 1 1 set 3 ! 1 i*\\Ii 1 1 2 1 i*i12 1 1 3 1
4 1 1 2 2 i*
! 2 1 3 2
." 2 1 1 3
3 2 1 2 3
3 3
1 1 2"_
4 2 1 2 1 2* \
3 1 2 (2, i, 2), (3, 0, 2)**, (3, i, i)
1 2 2*
_4 8 1 2 2 2*
1 1 2 3 2 2*
2 1 2 1 3 2
2 3 2
3 3 2
-" 8 2
3 3 3
_4 8 3 Set 4 1 1 i*
. 4 (3, _4, 4), (4, 3, 4), (4, 4, 3)
i_ 8 4 4 4 4
Set 5 1 1 I*
5 5 4
Set 6 1 1 i*
6 6 4
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COMPUTATIONAL FLOW OF STATE VECTORS
CHART 1
MODIFIED COMPUTATIONAL
FLOW WITH SETS
II JJ KK
set 7 1 1 i,
2 1 i,
3 1 !.
4 1 i.
5 i 1"
6 1 I*
7 ! 1
7 7 4
Set 14 1 1 i*
14 8 4
*These state probabilities have been previously comouted and will not be recomputed.
They are only dummy place holders used to show the alqorithm more clearly.
**States with 0 indices do not exist.
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The chart shows that only two sets need be in memory at
any one time--the set being computed and its predecessor set.
This occurs because the required states have either been com-
puted in the predecessor set or previously in the set being
computed. Also, with this method, only the state probabilities
not computed in prior sets are stored in array QLT. Therefore,
the number of unique states in each set for the case where
NP = 15, NPS = 2
NM = 9, NMS = 2
NB = 5, NBS = 2
is shown in the following chart:
Set No. of Unique States
1 1
2 7
3 19
4 37
5 36
6 44
7 52 ] largest two con-
J8 60 secutive sets
9 32
i0 32
Ii 32
12 32
13 32
14 32
CHART 2
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Set 7 and 8 are the largest two consecutive sets--having
52 and 60 states, respectively. Therefore, 0LT array need
only be dimensioned (112, 51), which is a total of 5712 words•
Using this method, the amount of storage reauired for OLT
array was decreased by 17,136 words.
The Vortran code reauired to compute the QLT array in
sets, with only two sets of probabilities in memory at anv
one time follows:
C FORTRAN ALGORITHM TO COMPUTE SETS OF STATES
C
C Compute QLT (i, IT) for _--_, 0, 0)directly for all time
steps.
C Initialize NSET(ISET) for set 1 to 1--only one state
vector exists in set i: (0, 0, 0).
NSET(1) = 1
C
C Compute maximum number of failures permitted including 0
NPF = NP - NPS + 1
NS_ = NM - NMS + 1
NBF = NB - NBS + 1
C
C Compute maximum indicies.
NPPI = NP + 1
N_I = NM + 1
XBPI = NB + 1
C
C Determine maximum set to compute.
_X = MAX0 (NPF, NMV, NBF)
-- 79
cc compute sets of state vector probabilities.
DO 200 ISET = 2, MAX
ISETB = ISET
ISETM = ISET
ISETP = ISET
IF (ISETB.GT.NBPI) ISETB = NBPI
IF (ISETM.GT.NMPI) ISETM = NMPI
IF (ISETP.GT.NPPI) ISETP = NPPI
C
C Initialize QLT index N to the number of vectors in the
C previous set plus one.
NUMPREV = NSET (ISET-I)
N = NUMPREV + 1
IF (ISET.EQ.2) GO TO 60
C
C Pop vector probabilities off 0LT array which were defined
C two sets ago by moving the predecessor set up in the array.
NPOP = NSET (ISET-2)
DO 50 M = l, NUMPREV
MM = NPOP + M
C Transfer QLT(MM, IT) for all time steps.
DO 50 IT = i, ITMAX
QLT(M, IT) = OLT(MM, IT)
50 CONTINUE
C
60 Continue
C
C Initialize unique state vector's counter to 0.
NSTOT = 0
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-- c
c Begin main three loops which define the state vectors
DO i00 KK = i, ISETB
DO i00 JJ = i, ISTEM
-- DO i00 II = i, ISETP
C DO not compute any previously computed state vector
-- C probabilities.
IF (II.LT.ISET.AND.JJ.LT.ISET.AND.KK.LT.ISET) GO TO i00
- I = II-i
J = JJ-i
_ K --KK-I
C
_ C Compute QLT(N, IT) for all time steps•
DO 75 IT=I, ITMAX
_ 75 CONTINUE
C
_ C Increase QLT index N and unique vector counter NSTOT by
C one.
_ N = N + 1
NSTOT = NSTOT + 1
C
i00 CONTINUE
_ C
C Store total number of unique vectors for the current set
_ C ISET.
NSET(ISET) = NSTOT
_ 200 CONTINUE
C
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This Fortran structure is the basic programming core for
the various CARE III models programmed thus far.
3.4.3 PROGRAM DIFFERENCES PER MODEL
The subroutine which computes the unique mathematical
calculations for each model is subroutine SUMMAT. This
subroutine and its associated functions vary for each model.
They represent the numerator in the integ_and of the inte-
grated form of the Kolmogorov equation:
SUMMAT
t t
QZ(t) = e I£(T)dT Qj (T) + Pj (T)_j£(T)Ij£(T)
d_
0 I£ (n) dne
The main concern in programming subroutine SUMMAT for
each model is to eliminate redundant computations. Two types
of function computations are required: functions which are
time dependent and functions which are vector dependent; i.e.,
dependent upon (i, j, k). The time dependent functions must
be removed from subroutine SUMMAT and computed in subroutine
TDXPEND. TDEPEND computes all time dependent functions once
and stores them in arrays. These arrays can later be accessed --
from subroutine SUMMAT each time the vector changes. This
approach keeps execution time at a minimum because it takes
much less time to retrieve a function value from an array
than it does to recompute the function each time the vector
(i, j, k) changes. SUMMAT then computes the vector dependent
portions of the model while accessing the time dependent arrays.
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-- 3 .4 .4 NUMERICAL INTEGRATION TECHNIQUES
The Trapezoidal rule
1 _x
_ f(x)dx = --_ [f(x0) + f(xl)]
x0
and Simmson's 1/3 rule
?]2 f (X)dx Ax
= "-_ [f(xO) + 4f(xI) + f(x2)]
-- x0
are the numer:ical ntegratlon techniques used within the
program to compute the integral
/0 ]t [ 0j(T) + P (T)cj (T) 1 (T), L J £ J£ aT!T I£(q)dq
__ e 0
_ of the Kolmogorov equation.
The Trapezoidal rule is used to commute the integral
-- from time 0 to time STEP where STEP is the step size or _x.
Simpson's 1/3 rule is used to commute the remaining intervals
-- as shown in the following Figure 3.6. (The subroutines associated
with these numerical techniques are called TRAPINT and SIMPINT.)
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IT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 i0 ii 12 13 14
T 0.0 STEP 5*STEP 10*STEP
TIME
o • •
Simoson's 1/3 Rule
IT
_here QLT(N, i) = 0.0
QLT(N, 2) = area 1 * e I£(T)dT
!tQLT(N, 3) = AREA 2 * e l£(?)dT0
_!t X£(T)dTQLT(N, 4) =(AREA 3 + area i) * e
!t I (T)dTQL'I_(N, 5) :(AREA4 + AREA 2)* e £
• _0_,£
QLT(N, ITSTPS) = (area ITSTPS - 1 + area ITSTPS - 3 (T)dT
+ area ITSTPS - 5 + ... + area i) e
•INTEGRATION METHODS
Figure 3.6
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-- 3.4.5 MACRO FLOW CHART OF SYSTEM UNRELIABILITY MODEL
The following macro flow chart shows the organization of
the entire basic model which comDuhes the system unreliability.
The loop structure computing the vectors in sets is shown in
relationship to the subroutines TDEPEND, SUMMAT, TRAPINT and
SIMPINT.
_t
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MACRO FLOW CHART
READ/
CONFIGURA-/
TION I
INPUTS /
I -
COMPUTE\
TIME DEPEND-/ LOOPTO --
ENT PORTIONS/ I_- COMPUTE
OF MODEL / _ QLT IN SETS
I _ -
ISET = 2 ISET COMPUTE
ISET = _ REMAINING
ISET +I MAX P*'s
I i
IPRINTSUM iI
POP SET I IOFQLT AND I
ISET-2 IP*'s FOR SYSTEMI
OFF QLT I
ARRAY .
( STOP)
KK = I
KK = KK+I ISET
I
LOOPS TO([_... JJ = 1 jj_ _ . COMPUTE
JJ = JJ+1 ISET STATEVECTOR(l,J, K)
I
II = i
II-= II+l ISEl
PAGE1 OF 2 86 CARE3 MACROFLOWCHART
/ LOOP TO
COMPUTE
i/ TIME STEPS/ I TO ITSTPS//
/
/
-- IT = I
IT< p = p._
IT = ImsmPs QLT(N,IT)
-- IT+I
I
' I I
_ SUMMAT> PRINT
COMPUTE I PROBABILITIES£-r
j=O
- I
COMPUTE
p*
(perfect
coverage)
TRAPINT
-- YES
USING
-- RULE
1/3
QLT(N,IT):
_ QLT(N,IT)
e-XZ-_ f
- l
CARE3 MACRO
PAGE2 OF 2 FLOWCHART
- 87
4.0 CARE III PROGRAM STRUCTURE -
An implementation of a Modularized Direct Access
Information System is the proposed structure for the CARE III
system. The system will consist of three main modules:
a. Batch or interactive input processor:
CAREINB or _AREINI
b. Coverage model: COVRGE
c. Reliability model: CARE3
The following flow diagrams depict the proposed design
of the CARE III system.
Two text input files are required: one to define the
computer configuration and one to aid in the calculation of
the coverage model. If coverage is preset per stage in the
configuration file INFILE, the coverage input file CVFILE
need not be defined by the user.
The Direct Access Information System (DAIS) files generated
by CARE III are designed to be random, word addressable mass
storage files. Each record within these files can be
accessed with a master index or subindex(es). The DAIS
files wil! contain the processed user input required by
programs COVRGE and CARE3. They will be made permanent disk
files by CARE III so that they can be modified if desired
without having to reinput the entire data set. Thus a second
run can use existing files CAREDF and CARECV, after minor
modifications have been made to them, by running program
CAREIN using only an updated portion of the original input.
This capability is especially convenient if the user runs the
interactive CAREIN program.
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_ The DAIS files are to be created and accessed through
the use of FORTRAN Mass Storage Input/Output (MSIO)
_ subroutines OPENMS, WRITMS, READMS and CLOSMS. Record Manager
word addressable file organization is used to i_plement these
_ files.
In the following flow diagrams the symbol _ name
<process it>
_performs/
-- denotes a separate routine for which a separate f!ow diagram
exists in the pages following. For a more detailed look at
-- the proposed system, see the CARE III Computer Program
Requirements Document.
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